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THE CONSENT MYTH: IMPROVING CHOICE 
FOR PATIENTS OF THE FUTURE 
CHARLOTTE A. TSCHIDER* 
ABSTRACT 
Consent has enjoyed a prominent position in the American privacy 
system since at least 1970, though historically, consent emerged from 
traditional notions of tort and contract. Largely because consent has an 
almost deferential power as a proxy for consumer choice, organizations 
increasingly use consent as a de facto standard for demonstrating privacy 
commitments. The Department of Health and Human Services and the 
Federal Trade Commission have integrated the concept of consent into 
health care, research, and general commercial activities. However, this de 
facto standard, while useful in some contexts, does not sufficiently promote 
individual patient interests within leading health technologies, including the 
Internet of Health Things and Artificial Intelligence. 
Despite consent’s prominence in United States law, this Article seeks to 
understand, more fully, consent’s role in modern health applications, then 
applies a philosophical-legal lens to clearly identify problems with consent 
in its current use. This Article identifies the principle issues with substituting 
consent for choice, the “consent myth,” a collection of five problems, then 
proposes principles for addressing these problems in contemporary health 
technologies.  
 
 “In God we trust. All others must bring data.” – Unknown1 
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University Symposium on Privacy & Trust, especially Danielle Citron. I would like to especially thank 
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1. This quotation is often attributed to W. Edwards Deming, but it is of unknown origin. See 
Barry Popik, “In God we trust. All others must bring data,” BIG APPLE BLOG (Oct. 19, 2015), https://ww 
w.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/entry/in_god_we_trust_all_others_must_bring_data/ [http 
s:// perma.cc/3VKS-DLPY]. 












“Consent” in the privacy context emerged as a mechanism to negotiate 
the private and public spheres of life. What began as a version of contractual 
agreement, an affirmative defense in tort, and a precursor to confidential 
relationships, has grown in digital times to epic proportions. The health 
industry alone uses at least four different variants of consent: traditional 
notice with explicit consent, express authorization, informed consent, and 
notice with recommended consent.2  
The consent mechanism has subsumed broader conceptions of consumer 
and patient choice, a concept implicit in broader social goals of autonomy 
and self-determination. This neglect of broad notions of choice and the 
synonymous treatment of consent as choice has led to a substantially weaker 
privacy model depending almost entirely on a set of beliefs, or rather myths, 
that privacy scholars and practitioners have widely acknowledged as 
longstanding problems. The dominant privacy model today operates almost 
exclusively by using adhesive privacy notices, followed by agreement to 
such terms, or consent. So long as the privacy notice is accurate and the 
natural person about whom data is collected (the data subject) agrees, an 
organization has met its privacy obligations.  
New connected health technologies have amplified these problems, 
demanding exploration of new privacy models to protect consumer and 
patient interests. The Internet of Health Things, or Internet-connected 
consumer health devices, have begun to generate large volumes of useful 
data, increasing potential data uses. Artificial Intelligence (AI), increasingly 
used in health applications like disease diagnosis, treatment outcome 
evaluations, and medical device functionality, requires large data volumes 
to produce reliable and effective AI algorithms.3 These technologies, which 
carry great promise for improving human health, seek to maximize data 
collection and use, making it more difficult for organizations to effectively 
communicate information in a privacy notice. The health technology 
environment has changed rapidly over the past forty years, boosted by 
Internet-connected resources, faster computing power, shrinking battery 
size, and transformative power of Internet mobility.4 However, the pace of 
 
2. It should be noted that this Article examines consent from the perspective of privacy 
considerations, rather than general patient knowledge with regard to medical procedures and clinical 
studies, or informed consent. There is a wealth of research on informed consent in the medical procedure 
context, which will not be incorporated here. See, e.g., Nadia N. Sawicki, Modernizing Informed 
Consent: Expanding the Boundaries of Materiality 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 821 (2016) (describing the 
limitations of informed consent).  
3. See Charlotte A. Tschider, Deus ex Machina: Regulating Cybersecurity and Artificial 
Intelligence for Patients of the Future, 5 SAVANNAH L. REV. 177, 183–84 (2018). 
4. Although often these aspects might indicate revolutionary changes to medicine, more likely 












the law, especially in relation to privacy considerations, has remained fairly 
static since the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the Department of Health and 
Human Services’s (HHS) 2002 Privacy Rule.5 The Privacy Rule, 
incorporated by HHS, established patient rights and organizational 
obligations to be enforced under HIPAA. Despite updates of the Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009 
(HITECH Act), the Privacy Rule has essentially remained the same, as have 
the Federal Trade Commission privacy principles.6 The lack of health 
privacy law updates consistent with the evolution of modern health 
technology has created incompatible and, to some extent, abusive privacy 
practices.7 What may have provided minimally sufficient consumer choice 
in a traditional health context no longer safeguards consumer privacy 
interests with modern health technologies.8  
This Article builds on a bedrock issue raised in Daniel J. Solove’s 
Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma: although consent 
fulfills certain needs in our privacy system, we are rather expecting consent 
to do too much,9 specifically that notice coupled with consent has been 
positioned as a panacea for nearly all privacy problems. Unfortunately, the 
consent mechanism is imperfect: although consent may be useful in some 
scenarios, it does not fulfill greater goals of individual choice implicit in 
privacy goals. Contextual integrity, however, does provide a helpful tool for 
evaluating legal schemes, including the normative role consent plays as a 
functional representation of choice and identifying its considerable 
limitations, including whether it can, at present, fulfill autonomy goals. This 
paper adds to the existing privacy literature by applying Helen 
Nissenbaum’s philosophical lens of contextual inquiry to identify and 
categorize the five primary problems with consent, then proposes an 
alternative model, as principles, to better support individual choice.  
 
Nicolas P. Terry, Information Technology’s Failure to Disrupt Health Care, 13 NEV. L. J. 722, 723–24 
(2013). Still, the different technology models do, to some extent, frustrate traditional notice and consent 
models.  
5. See The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat 1936 (1996); HIPAA—the Federal Medical Privacy Rule, CITIZENS’ COUNCIL FOR HEALTH 
FREEDOM (Apr. 2003), http://www.cchfreedom.org/cchf.php/268 [https://perma.cc/BD8U-Y5J8]. The 
first version of HIPAA required that Congress develop a privacy rule by August 1999. Failing this, HHS 
would have to draft a privacy rule. Id. 
6. Although certain aspects of HIPAA were updated via the HITECH Act, these updates mostly 
expanded obligations to Business Associates, introduced specific data breach notification obligations, 
and enhanced Office for Civil Rights enforcement powers. Core aspects of privacy notice and 
authorizations remained. See infra Part II.B and accompanying notes.  
7. See infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
8. See infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
9. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1880, 1894 (2013). 











Part I briefly explores the evolution of health technology, including the 
shift from fiduciary and context-rich relationships to more attenuated 
human-computer interfaces. Part II discusses a brief history of consent in 
health care, including social developments that led to privacy concerns and 
a desire to address them. In Part III, I apply Helen Nissenbaum’s concept of 
contextual inquiry to examine the failure of consent as choice resulting from 
five distinct problems, the “consent myth.” Part IV responds to these 
problems by proposing four principles to improve choice for more effective 
consumer engagement advancing individual autonomy.10  
I. HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES FRUSTRATE TRADITIONAL PRIVACY LAW 
REGIMES 
Modern health technologies include everything from websites providing 
disease information to mobile health apps and home health robotics. These 
technologies have intensified privacy debates, especially when technology 
incorporating Internet connectivity or large data collection creates new 
potential risks to the individual, such as data misuse or loss through 
cyberattacks.11 
The Internet of Health Things (IoHT) is a technology that connects 
physical devices, such as medical devices, with the Internet. The IoHT, 
which include the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT), is a variation of the 
well-known Internet of Things (IoT), or the conversion of self-contained 
analog consumer devices to increasingly Internet-tethered consumer 
devices.12 IoHT devices span the marketplace of health-related devices: 
connected medical devices, consumer self-care, and health improvement 
technologies.13 IoHT devices are produced by highly regulated market 
sectors, such as health care and medical device manufacturing, as well as 
the comparatively less-regulated consumer product manufacturing.14 IoHT 
devices include everything from connected pacemakers to mobile device-
 
10. The consent myth and resulting principles to address it may also apply to additional consumer 
contexts. Here, we have narrowed the field for purposes of clearly articulating how contextual 
differences may create problems for new technologies. 
11. See Tschider, supra note 3, at 187. 
12. Nicolas P. Terry, Will the Internet of Things Transform Healthcare?, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 327, 329 (2016); IoMT (Internet of Medical Things) or healthcare IoT , TECHTARGET, https://in 
ternetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/definition/IoMT-Internet-of-Medical-Things [https://perma.cc/T7 
3V-S9FF] (last updated Aug. 2015) [hereinafter Terry, IoT]; Bernard Marr, Why the Internet of Medical 
Things (IoMT) Will Start to Transform Healthcare in 2018, FORBES (Jan. 25, 2018, 1:41 AM), https:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/01/25/why-the-internet-of-medical-things-iomt-will-start-totr 
ansform-healthcare-in-2018/#733399274a3c [https://perma.cc/R4PP-YMHU]; S. M. Riazul Islam, 
Daehan Kwak, MD. Humaun Kabir, Mahmud Hossain & Kyung-Sup Kwak, The Internet of Things for 
Health Care: A Comprehensive Survey, 3 IEEE ACCESS 678 (2015) [hereinafter Islam et al.]. 
13. See Terry, IoT, supra note 12. 












connected insulin pumps, Internet-connected X-Ray machines, and fitness 
trackers.  
A. Privacy and IoHT 
IoHT devices are unique in that these devices directly collect personal 
data through automated and pervasive interaction, which may or may not 
implicate device security and safety.15 IoHT, then, can be understood as a 
type of continuous surveillance, wherein data are collected by private 
organizations for any number of purposes. These purposes likely include 
consumer-expected data uses, such as product registration, basic device 
functionality, or product improvement activities, but may also include more 
attenuated purposes designed to benefit the consumer or the manufacturer. 
IoHT manufacturers may anticipate financial benefits not only from selling 
IoHT devices but also from data collection efforts.16  
IoHT devices may collect a wide variety of data as part of functionality 
and the human-computer interactive model. The data may differ in data 
sensitivity, for example from an individual heart rate or evidence of a 
serious disease to what a person might have eaten for breakfast. These data, 
for most IoHT implementations, will be combined with other data collected, 
bought, or exchanged, sometimes about the same users.17 These other data 
feed big data implementations, which power the “smart” aspect of IoHT 
offering advanced analytics, improved algorithm performance, or even 
feeding machine learning utilities.18 Data collected as part of big data sets 
both have utility for an effective IoHT implementation and simultaneously 
may provide personally identifiable health data or proxies for these data.19 
 
15. See Terry, IoT, supra note 12, at 342–43. 
16. Krista Kennedy observes that “one must learn to work closely with a machine that is inserted 
into a bodily orifice and whose consistent use affects cognitive processing and neural pathway 
development.” Krista Kennedy, Designing for Human-Machine Collaboration: Smart Hearing Aids as 
Wearable Technologies, 5 COMM. DESIGN Q. 40, 41 (2017) (describing how the hearing aid, an IoHT 
device, requires human interaction to function properly to the advantage of the human).  
17. Big data are defined by the four “Vs”: volume, variety, velocity, and veracity. Data was 
“getting big” before the advent of the IoT, but the IoT have injected substantial volume and variety, with 
increased velocity and veracity. These data sets will likely include data of IoT provenance, with other 
data, as well. See Charles McLellan, The Internet of Things and Big Data: Unlocking the Power, ZDNET 
(Mar. 2, 2015, 9:39 AM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/the-internet-ofthings-and-big-data-unlocking-
the-power/ [https://perma.cc/5NT7-E35D]. 
18. Improved functionality results from integration of IoT devices with large data sets powering 
machine learning utilities, which use big data sets to develop powerful algorithms. See, e.g., Islam et al., 
supra note 12, at 683 (describing the variety of data layers and sources in IoHT technical 
implementations); Prashant Natarajan Iyer, A Tale of 2 T’s: When Analytics and Artificial Intelligence 
Go Bad, HEALTHCARE IT TODAY (July 13, 2016), https://www.emrandhipaa.com/author/prashant/ [http 
s://perma.cc/4UD6-P24Y].  
19. There are tremendous benefits to data collection and use, especially for patient care and 
research purposes. See W. Nicholson Price II, Black-box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECHN. 419, 435 











It is often unclear, at the time of device purchase or prescription, which data 
may exist in the data set overall, their provenance, and their overall degree 
of identifiability within the broader data set. For these reasons, IoHT 
introduces a special type of privacy risk for consumers and patients when it 
is implemented using cutting-edge technologies like big data sets and 
machine learning utilities.20 However, the degree of legal protection 
afforded patients or consumers often differs based on how the device is 
procured, rather than what the device can do.21 
One particularly interesting example of legal protection inconsistency 
involves hearing aids. Nearly 37.5 million adults have a hearing 
impairment, and only a fraction of those adults use hearing aids (from 16–
30%, depending on age).22 To solve hearing aid access issues, Congress 
passed over-the-counter hearing aid legislation in 2017, which permits 
hearing aid companies to sell hearing aids directly to consumers.23  
Although the availability of hearing aids to a broader population might 
satisfy an important public good, smart hearing aids also illustrate a 
compelling example of inconsistent regulation for IoHT devices. Modern 
hearing aids employ cutting edge technologies, including geolocation and 
predefined settings associated with automatically defined physical spaces, 
to improve aid performance.24 These aids now connect to mobile devices 
and can be controlled through a mobile application.25 Hearing aids 
prescribed through a health care provider that processes payment, such as 
insurance reimbursement, will likely be regulated by the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).26 HIPAA mandates specific 
notice and authorization requirements, as well as additional privacy and 
security rule standards, depending on the nature of data collection and use.27  
Hearing aids available over-the-counter, regardless of whether they are 
identical to prescribed devices, will likely only need to meet a 
 
(2015); Charlotte A. Tschider, Regulating the IoT: Discrimination, Privacy, and Cybersecurity in the 
Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DEN. L. REV. 87, 99 (2018). 
20. Tschider, supra note 19, at 104. 
21. See Terry I, supra note 12, at 339 n.82; Nicolas P. Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the 
Age of Big Data, 81 UMKC L. REV. 385, 386 (2012). 
22. Quick Statistics about Hearing, NAT’L INST. ON DEAFNESS & OTHER COMM. DISORDERS, 
https://www.nidcd.nih.gov/health/statistics/quickstatistics-hearing [https://perma.cc/468V-B5ND] (last 
updated Dec. 15, 2016). 
23. US Senate Passes OTC Hearing Aid Act as Part of FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017, 
HEARING REV. (Aug. 4, 2017), http://www.hearingreview.com/2017/08/us-senatepasses-otc-hearing-ai 
d-act-part-fda-reauthorization-act-2017-ada-announces/ [https://perma.cc/Y4PT-QQQA]. 
24. Sarah Bricker, Tech Tip: How to Manage Your Hearing Aid Memories, STARKEY HEARING 
TECHNS. (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.starkey.com/blog/2016/12/trulink-hearing-aid-memories [https: 
//perma.cc/4KPW-5NXE]. 
25. Id. 
26. See infra Part II and accompanying notes. 












comparatively lower threshold of not engaging in “unfair or deceptive trade 
practices.”28 Although organizations selling these hearing aids must not 
engage in unfair or deceptive trade practices, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) does not otherwise mandate any specific privacy model: the model is 
responsive rather than preventative.29 Between the HIPAA and FTC models, 
the HIPAA model is more restrictive but narrowly applies to predefined 
organizations that fit specific HIPAA definitions. Therefore, differential 
obligations for otherwise identical devices collecting and using identical 
data illustrate a fundamental problem in how the United States protects 
consumer and patient privacy interests in relation to IoHT. Privacy 
regulation for the same or similar IoHT devices might result in vastly 
different compliance, none of which may effectively support consumer 
choice. And choice becomes more important as privacy risks increase. For 
example, location data collected could present greater privacy risks when 
those data are shared with or sold to third parties for commercial or 
aggregation purposes. Geological data may establish patterns of behavior, 
movement, or frequently visited locations.  
B. Human-Computer Interaction 
Almost all IoHT, like smart hearing aids, automate features and functions 
that historically required a human actor for some intervention, such as a 
medical doctor interpreting data. The effect of automation, a precursor to 
more advanced forms of AI,30 has been an increasing opacity in relation to 
data collection and use due to the removal of human actors and their 
attendant relationships of trust.31 While traditional human-to-human 
relationships involve some communicative mechanisms and opportunities 
 
28. See infra Part II and accompanying notes. A finding of unfair trade practices or deceptive 
trade practices is a responsive, ex post determination, rather than providing any ex ante set of 
requirements.  
29. See infra Part II and accompanying notes. The FTC has not passed any specific rules at the 
same level of stringency as mandated under HIPAA.  
30. Kamila Hankiewicz, What Is the Real Difference Between Automation and AI?, BECOMING 
HUMAN (Aug. 9, 2018), https://becominghuman.ai/what-is-the-realdifference-between-automation-and-
ai-366513e0c910 [https://perma.cc/5GG7-4FF7]. 
31. Id.; see infra Part III and accompanying notes. The concept of trust has historically been a 
product of human-to-human relationships. By replacing or distancing human-to-human relationships, 
artificially intelligent and connected machines complicate traditional trust relationships, especially of a 
fiduciary nature (e.g., the doctor-patient relationship). See Robin C. Feldman, Artificial Intelligence: 
The Importance of Trust & Distrust, 21 GREEN BAG 2D 201, 206–07 (2018). Feldman describes the 
changing dynamics of trust in AI-enabled contexts, including both over-confidence and lack of trust in 
human-computer interactions. “[T[rust and distrust can wrap back around each other and collide to 
provide the maximum risk for chaos and societal disruption.” Id. at 209. 











for inquiry and response, the human-to-computer interface offers 
comparatively fewer opportunities.32  
When human-to-computer interfaces supplant human-to-human 
relationships, traditional privacy contexts do not necessarily transfer to 
these new interfaces, especially the privacy notion of “choice.” As a result, 
consent may not effectively reinforce important patient and consumer 
privacy interests or enhance trust relationships in new IoHT contexts where 
downstream data uses and associated privacy risks cannot be effectively 
described in the privacy notice.33  
II. CONSENT AND THE LAW 
Consent as a legal mechanism in privacy law originally extended from 
the commercialization of historically personal relationships in 17th and 18th 
Century Europe, where commercialization divorced individuals from local 
economies.34 However, until the early 1900s, doctors and other medical 
practitioners within a small community still provided healthcare.35 
Provisioning healthcare was often framed by a relationship of personal trust 
between a medical practitioner and an individual patient, a fiduciary 
relationship hallmarked by a vulnerability of one individual within the 
relationship due to information asymmetries.36  
Consent, “an act of reason accompanied with deliberation,”37 initially 
developed as a means for negotiating disclosures between the private self 
 
32. See Kennedy, supra note 16. Kennedy notes the existence of human-computer collaboration 
as a phenomenon resulting from pervasive technology and human interactions, where a human must rely 
on technology for functionality. It is this Author’s view that this relationship does not provide the same 
opportunities for communication about individual privacy.  
33. It should be noted that this Author also questions whether consent is the appropriate 
mechanism for traditional relationships involving the transfer of personal information. However, the use 
of consent in human-to-computer contexts is much more problematic, as explained through the 
remainder of this Article.  
34. After the 17th Century, the public and private spheres began to connect in important ways, 
especially related to commerce and information dissemination. However, local communities became 
substantially more reliant on regional and national markets. These two simultaneous movements 
transformed how individuals participated in both the market and their personal lives. JUDITH WAGNER 
DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 9 (1997); see also, 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 3 (Thomas Burger 
trans., 1991).  
35. The Gale Group, Inc., The 1900s Medicine and Health: Overview, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM 
(2003), https://www.encyclopedia.com/socialsciences/culture-magazines/1900s-medicine-and-healthov 
erview [https://perma.cc/7KEG-6CEU]. By way of example, in 1900, most doctors performed surgeries 
at their patients’ homes. Id. 
36. Fiduciary relationships usually involve sensitive or high-stakes circumstances, where 
forming the relationship (and receiving services) is a public good (such as improving health) or where 
the reliant and more vulnerable party could lose something substantial (e.g., freedom, money, or 
employment). See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477, 522 (2006).  
37. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY ONLINE, Consent, https://thelawdictionary.org/consent/ 












and the public marketplace, ultimately becoming a proxy for choice that 
accompanied individual medical practitioner-patient relationships.38  
A. Consent under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
Technical advancements in computerized medical record-keeping and a 
desire for administrative efficiencies prompted examination of privacy 
concerns outside common law and statutory solutions in healthcare.39 In 
1996, HIPAA became the first federal privacy law passed in the health care 
sector, although details of the Privacy Rule followed in 2003.40  
The HIPAA Privacy Rule, as implemented, requires Covered Entities 
(CEs) to display (or outsource display of) an annual notice of privacy 
practices for uses related to treatment, payment, and health care 
operations.41 Although consent is not required, treatment providers (health 
care providers) must make a “good faith effort” to obtain the individual’s 
written acknowledgement of notice receipt.42  
Implicitly, HHS’s HIPAA notice provides better information when 
individuals have contextual cues regarding their privacy or can ask 
questions of their medical practitioner.43 For example, it is not unexpected 
 
38. Within small communities, unauthorized disclosures of health information eventually 
became a concern when sensitive information was shared with others in the community. Consent, 
therefore, became an inexpensive way to safeguard against legal claims of confidentiality breaches. See 
Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law, in PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY, PLI 5, 17 
(2006) (quoting Simonsen v. Swensen, 177 N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920), in which the court identified a ‘wrong’ 
and recognition of damages for loss of confidentiality), https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewconten 
t.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=2076&context=faculty_publications [htt 
ps://perma.cc/LA5A-BMHT]. 
39. Donna Bowers, The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act: Is It Really All 
That Bad? 14 BAYLOR UNIV. MED. CTR. PROC. 347 (2001) It should be noted that HIPAA was originally 
created for insurance portability purposes, which explains its narrow application to specific covered 
entities. 
40. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2018); HIPPA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 264, 110 Stat. 1936, 2033-34 
(1996); see Gina Marie Stevens, CRS Report: A Brief Summary of the HIPAA Medical Privacy Rule, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Apr. 30, 2003), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs 
5165/m1/1/high_res_d/RS20934_2003Apr30.pdf. See also Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, 
Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 714–
15 (2007) (discussing the limited efficacy of HIPAA privacy with respect to electronic health records). 
41. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520 (2018). The Privacy Rule has not been updated since its final passage 
in August 2002. Although timing for providing the Notice of Privacy Practices differs depending on the 
type of CE, ideally the notice is provided prior to an individual providing Protected Health Information 
(PHI) to the CE or its Business Associates (BAs). 
42. Id. 
43. Implied consent as is implemented for primary data uses under HIPAA (consent by virtue of 
opportunity to read and desire to receive service) relies on clear contextual information. Authorization, 
in contrast, communicates uses outside typical context, which requires additional confirmation of 
understanding and explicit consent to specifically defined uses. What is the Difference between 
“Consent” and “Authorization” under the HIPAA Privacy Rule?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 
(July 26, 2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/faq/264/what-is-the-difference-betweenco 
nsent-and-authorization/index.html [https://perma.cc/VKN8-8SPQ]. 











that an individual’s health data will be used in connection with providing 
health treatment, or that it might be relevant for receiving health insurance 
reimbursement. When personal information collection, use, or transfer is 
reasonably expected because a contextual framework exists, notice 
improves individual awareness by building on existing expectations. 
Because data use and transfer are tightly linked to operational processes, 
high-context data processing is sometimes called primary use.44  
HIPAA requires additional authorization outside operational activities, 
and when using and disclosing PHI to adhere to the “minimum necessary” 
for specifically communicated uses.45 HIPAA authorization operates like 
explicit consent, or consent that requires specific and clear manifestation of 
an individual’s agreement.46 Under HIPAA, authorization is reserved for 
operational uses beyond those directly communicated and connected to 
provisioning health care treatment, facilitating application of insurance 
reimbursement, and billing processing.47 Authorization includes disclosure 
to another facility, physician, clinic partners, involvement of third parties, 
or additional data uses (e.g., research, product improvement, data sharing).48 
To fully complete the authorization process, a CE must gather an 
individual’s explicit consent prior to PHI collection or disclosure using a 
detailed authorization document.49 For example, authorization procedures 
will be used when medical records are transferred to a new facility, such as 
when the patient has requested this transfer or has been referred by a general 
practice physician to a specialty doctor.50 In that circumstance, not only is a 
patient reading an authorization form that communicates the reason for data 
transfer, patients often fill out the authorization form with a doctor or nurse 
present and available to explain the purpose for authorization. CEs likely 
facilitate HIPAA authorization when the individual has some context for 
understanding the data transfer, such as when explaining the need for 
another medical procedure or future service. 
Authorizations may be used for a wide variety of less common purposes, 
such as disclosing records to another family member, when third parties 
 
44. Charles Safran, Meryl Bloomrosen, W. Edward Hammond, Steven Labkoff, Suzanne 
Markel-Fox, Paul C. Tang & Don E. Detmar, Toward a National Framework for the Secondary Use of 
Health Data: An American Medical Informatics Association White Paper, 14 J. AM. MED. INFORM. 
ASSOC. 1, 4 (2007). 
45. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506. 
46. Id. Authorization must be expressed and written in nature.  
47. What is the Difference between “Consent” and “Authorization” under the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule?, supra note 43. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. Authorization documents must include the following information: description of PHI to 
be used and disclosed, expiration date, purpose for which the information is used or disclosed. 
Provisioning health services cannot be conditioned on the individual executing an authorization.  












wish to use such information for product development purposes, or when a 
clinician wishes to use previously collected data for research purposes. 
Commonly, authorizations are used for third party data transfer.51 Use 
requiring authorization is commonly called secondary use, because the 
desired use is not implicit in the purpose under which it was originally 
collected.52  
A lack of clear direction has created confusion and potential efficiency 
issues for large information databases, including those that may provide the 
infrastructure for IoHT functionality.53 Further, healthcare consent and 
authorization disproportionately affects organizations with many discrete, 
non-operational uses.54 HIPAA requires authorization for each specific use, 
which means that organizations storing data in a large database and running 
clinical trials may have to execute, store, and update (as necessary) two or 
more authorizations for each participant in addition to informed consent 
required for human research.55  
Although this health privacy framework might appear fairly 
comprehensive, the scope of ethical oversight and laws is actually quite 
narrow. Many organizations, especially those creating new technologies and 
those that do not receive insurance payment for services, usually will not be 
regulated by HIPAA as a Covered Entity or a Covered Entity’s Business 
Associate or be bound under traditional confidentiality obligations, as might 
be obligated under a fiduciary relationship. Organizations manufacturing, 
distributing, or offering services for IoHT devices, medical applications 
(such as mobile health apps), telehealth, or out-of-pocket health care, may 
not qualify as either a Covered Entity or a Business Associate.56 Given 
 
51. Third party data transfer is presupposed by HIPAA’s interoperability and portability goals: 
an individual should benefit from integration with other facilities and be able to exercise preference in 
care. However, many of these transfers may actually be permitted by HIPAA without explicit consent. 
See Understanding Some of HIPAA’s Permitted Uses and Disclosures, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS. (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/privacy/guidance/permitted-
uses/index.html [https://perma.cc/HN2E-W7W9]. 
52. SHARON HOFFMAN, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS AND MEDICAL BIG DATA 20 (2016). 
53. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116, 46.117; U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, 
PUB. NO. 04-5489, RESEARCH REPOSITORIES, DATABASES, AND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE (Jan. 2004), 
https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/research_repositories.asp [https://perma.cc/3M3C-ZTKN]. 
Certainly, arguments could easily be made in favor of strict authorization requirements. Authorization 
serves an important purpose: to specifically notify an individual of additional uses and secure explicit 
consent for purposes of patient awareness, to diminish potentially excessive or abusive practices, and to 
reduce potential for misuse or fraud. However, the potential benefit of future data use across 
organizations in furtherance of scientific or research goals certainly is very persuasive.  
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Covered Entities are defined as health care providers (when transmitting electronic PHI for 
insurance-qualifying purposes), a health plan (insurers, company health plans, government programs, 
and Health Maintenance Organizations), or a health care clearinghouse that process nonstandard health 
information into as standard format. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. BAs are persons or entities that perform 
functions or activities on behalf of a CE for HIPAA-applicable purposes. BAs can perform legal, 











HIPAA’s narrow application, it is likely emerging health technology might 
only be regulated by the general oversight of the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC).  
B. Consent under the FTC’s Fair Information Practices (FIPs) 
In the early 2000s, the FTC expanded on Fair Information Practices 
originally identified by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare (HEW) (1973), subsequently defining these practices as “Notice, 
Choice, Access, and Security,” with FTC enforcement.57 Notably, HEW’s 
choice principle delineated between internal, or primary, and external, or 
secondary, uses.58 After HEW’s initial articulation of the Fair Information 
Practices, the FTC has increasingly used the term consent interchangeably 
with choice.59 In contemporary FTC communications to organizations 
doing business in the United States, these discrete concepts appear to have 
merged or at least have been linked, prompting the facial misunderstanding 
that consent is choice.60 Consent, therefore, has become a legally defensible 
piece of evidence for most information handling practices:61 if an 
organization provides a privacy notice and solicits explicit consent, the 
organization has met its obligation, regardless of the notice’s contents, so 
 
actuarial, consulting, aggregation, management, administrative, accreditation, or financial services. See 
Business Associates, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (July 26, 2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/fo 
rprofessionals/privacy/guidance/businessassociates/index.html [https://perma.cc/3V7W-YJAW]. See 
Adopted Standards and Operating Rules, CTRS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Administrative-Simplification/HIPAAACA/Adopted 
StandardsandOperatingRules.html [https://perma.cc/7EBU-F33Z]. 
57. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICAL USES OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS: 
RECENT RESEARCH AND PRESENT PROSPECTS 472 (Jan. 1, 1984). FTC, Privacy Online: Fair 
Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace (May 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files 
/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-co 
mmission-report/privacy2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EMY-MT8A]. 
58. Id. By any indication, the FTC seems to observe a difference between expected and 
unexpected uses, wherein initial personal information collection and use ties directly to provisioning 
services or providing products. However, other uses may be less expected from the point of initial 
relationship formation, making actual “choice” a more attenuated concept.  
59. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 8 (June 1998), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf, 
(describing ‘choice’ by describing consent options in Web environments and other mechanisms for 
parental consent) [hereinafter FTC 1998]; FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY 
UPDATE: 2016 2 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-upd 
ate-2016/privacy_and_data_security_update_2016_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV87-HZLE] 
(referencing choice mechanisms). It is important to acknowledge that choice, as a concept, reflects a 
mental process and subsequent action, including inaction. Consent, however, is often considered a 
procedural mechanism. Trading consent for choice substitutes both the mental process and action with 
only a procedural mechanism. 
60. See FTC 1998, supra note 59.  












long as the contents are not misleading or incorrect (deceptive).62 As the 
FTC has noted: “If a consumer is provided with clear and conspicuous 
notice prior to the collection of information, there is no basis for concluding 
that a consumer cannot generally make an informed choice.”63  
The United States has created, at best, a layered and accretive regulatory 
privacy regime; at worst, an inconsistent and ineffective framework. 
Although HIPAA and the FTC’s Fair Information Practices each introduce 
slightly different models for facilitating consumer choice, none of these 
address the core issue: using consent as a proxy for individual choice.64 
III. THE CONSENT MYTH 
Although consent has been positioned as a proxy for choice, privacy 
law’s goals should advance individual autonomy, rather than simply giving 
the appearance of legitimacy. Helen Nissenbaum’s reflections on contextual 
inquiry provide a philosophical-legal lens through which the use of consent 
is legitimate or problematic in relation to its context. The “consent myth” 
aggregates privacy’s failings with respect to consent for purposes of 
confronting these issues and finding comparatively better models to 
advance individual choice. 
A. Evaluating Autonomy, Context, and Choice 
Consent, as a concept, emerged from the common law as something 
similar to, yet apart from, legal concepts of agreement within contract, and 
Congress and administrative agencies accepted and adopted this model. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “consent” as something more than simply 
 
62. Although Section 5 permits the FTC to enforce against unfair or deceptive trade practices, 
characteristically, the FTC has primarily focused on deceptive practices, likely because these practices 
are easier to prove.  
63. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A 
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS AND POLICYMAKERS 15, E-5 (Dec. 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/s 
ites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-consumer-protection-preliminar 
y-ftc-staff-report-protecting-consumer/101201privacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/2482-VQ4K] 
[hereinafter FTC 2010].  
64. It should be noted that the General Data Protection Regulation, 2016/679 updating the 
European Union’s (EU) oft-copied Data Protection Directive, 95/46/EC, requires explicit consent for 
sensitive data collection and use, while permitting individual countries derogation. This derogation 
permits individual countries to completely bar sensitive data collection. Further, consent, specified in 
Article 7, must pertain to discrete data uses. However, consent is not the only valid lawful basis for data 
processing. In addition to legal obligations, contract, vital interests, and public activities, the EU also 
permits data be processed for certain “legitimate interests” in the GDPR’s Recital 47, which incorporates 
a balancing test. This balancing test illustrates a recognition by the EU that in some cases, an 
organization’s interests may outweigh an individual to process data without consent or another valid 
lawful basis. Although this article focuses on the United States’ approach to consent, the concept of 
legitimate interest may offer an alternative to consent for some data uses, especially for large database 
collection. 











a formulation of agreement. Consent is something personal that requires 
individual engagement: “a concurrence of wills, an act of reason 
accompanied with deliberation.”65  
Helen Nissenbaum has described information distribution norms 
including relational concepts of free choice, discretion, and confidentiality, 
expected in fiduciary relationships, as well as need, entitlement, and 
obligation, concepts typical of contractual relationships.66 Autonomy 
informs choices made when “guided by principles . . . adopted as result of 
critical reflection.”67 Presumptively, an individual can only legitimately 
exert choice when an individual can exercise autonomy,68 and autonomous 
life involves choices after “full deliberative rationality . . . with full 
awareness of facts and after careful consideration of the consequences.”69 
Privacy can be defined as a form of autonomy, self-determination regarding 
one’s personal information through choice about its collection and use.70 
Privacy has a broader social value and context, in that it fulfills important 
social and personal functions, such as reinforcing a healthcare relationship 
where information exchange is crucial to effective treatment.71 Nissenbaum 
sees benefit in both recognizing these important functions and the free-flow 
of information, injecting the concept of contextual integrity.72 Contextual 
integrity examines norms and expectations while considering informational 
relationships to context, individual roles, role relationships, rules of flow, 
and impact on underlying values.73  
Although traditional healthcare environments may provide more 
effective contextual cues and real assistance related to privacy concerns, 
 
65. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY ONLINE, supra note 37. 
66. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Inquiry, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 124 (2004). 
67. Id. at 130 (reflecting on theories advanced by Gerald Dworkin, Ruth Gavison, Jeffrey 
Reiman, and Julie Cohen). 
68. Id.  
69. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 408 (1971). Certainly “thicker” autonomy proponents 
might argue for a greater recognition of caveat emptor, especially as this applies in circumstances with 
multiple choices. However, for privacy, exogeneity issues combined with substantial bargaining power 
disparities (especially for markets with few alternatives) reduce the ability for an individual to 
completely negotiate to their own benefit. Health contexts present inherently unequal bargaining models, 
which is why fiduciary duties often co-exist in these contexts. 
70. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 81–82 (2010). 
71. Id. at 132 (quoting Priscilla Regan). Janlori Goldman has also described the essential function 
of privacy for medical purposes: without “robust protections,” individuals will not seek medical care or 
advance research interest. See also, JERRY BERMAN & JANLORI GOLDMAN, BENTON FOUNDATION 
PROJECT ON COMMUNICATIONS & INFORMATION POLICY OPTIONS, A FEDERAL RIGHT OF INFORMATION 
PRIVACY: THE NEED FOR REFORM 32 (1989), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED324011. pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2NRY-SBTW] (identifying the need for a federal privacy law, including more 
restrictions for sensitive data use and data uses above what is disclosed). Privacy reinforces the quality 
of fiduciary relationships by enhancing trust, and fiduciary relationships usually involve some 
commitment of privacy, to the benefit of the dependent party. NISSENBAUM, supra note 70, at 132. 













upon contextual inquiry, a primary issue emerges that, at its root, 
undermines consumer choice. First, individuals alone may not be able to 
influence outcomes in their interest because privacy bargaining occurs 
through relationships with substantial power differentials (implicit in 
healthcare relationships) and within an inherently adhesive bargaining 
scheme. When individuals have few opportunities to freely bargain and 
cannot make an effectively informed choice due to other information 
asymmetries, individuals cannot ultimately fulfill their own privacy 
interests: they have no actual “choice.”  
In broad strokes, privacy law has dual aims: 1) to advise individuals of 
planned activities involving their data, so that individuals can make choices 
about these practices, and 2) to not impose arduous requirements on 
commercial activities employing these practices. The current consent 
mechanism alerts an individual to activities involving personal data without 
actually advising individuals of the risk. 
B. Consent’s Problems 
Although personal information collected under a highly regulated health 
care privacy regime does enjoy better comprehensive privacy practices, the 
superimposition of consent for choice has caused a number of problems for 
individual autonomy.  
The Consent Myth is a set of five problems that build on each other: the 
voluntariness problem, the structural problem, the cognition problem, the 
exogeneity problem, and the temporal problem. Each problem evidences a 
way in which consent has failed to effectively support autonomous choice, 
to varying degrees, depending on the context in which an individual or 
product exists.  
1. Consent Myth 1: Individuals Have Meaningful Choice When 
Privacy Notices are Used (Voluntariness Problem)74 
Most privacy policies (including a Notice of Privacy Practices) would be 
defined as contracts of adhesion. Contracts of adhesion are called adhesive 
contracts because they involve one-sided practices: essentially, a “take it or 
leave it” model and evidence unequal bargaining power.75 This can be 
problematic especially in the health care industry, whether highly regulated 
 
74. When individuals cannot voluntarily consent, they cannot be said to have “informed 
consent.” Further, many privacy policies and terms of service are similar between potential competitors 
(or at least appear to be similar to a consumer), so the concept of market competition often does not 
apply. 
75. Nora K. Duncan, Adhesion Contracts: A Twentieth Century Problem for a Nineteenth 
Century Code, 34 LA. L. REV. 1081 (1974). 











or less regulated, because typically: 1) individuals often require or depend 
on services or products to survive or to improve their lives, 2) individuals 
inherently trust organizations operating in the health care sector because of 
existing medical confidentiality relationships, and 3) alternative options 
may not exist in the marketplace. Contract law does recognize a legal limit 
on contracts of adhesion: unconscionability.76 
Contracts of adhesion are not inherently coercive. They are, however, 
common in privacy policies: coercive privacy practices often include 
“bundling” of terms together in one agreement.77 Bundling makes reading 
privacy policies longer and subsequently more difficult to read, which in 
turn makes these likely to be ignored.78 In addition to these coercive issues, 
trust also plays a role in interpreting privacy policies and their relative 
fairness, for consent purposes. As described by many scholars, focusing on 
the concept of trust in relationships can offer an opportunity for 
understanding what duties are owed to each party.79 Sometimes, trust is 
misplaced, not because one party breached any confidential relationship, but 
because an organization benefitted from some transference of trust.80 
Organizations under the auspices of “health technology” often benefit from 
this transference, and because often organizations provide products or 
 
76. Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. 
REV. 485, 467 (1967) 
77. See, Twila Brase, HIPAA’s Unhealthy Privacy Deception, CNS NEWS (Dec. 15, 2014), 
https://www.cnsnews.com/commentary/twila-brase/hipaa-s-unhealthy-privacy-deception [https://perm 
a.cc/FYG8-3U9M]; Bojana Kostić & Emmanuel Vargas Penagos, The Freely Given Consent and the 
“Bundling” Provision under GDPR, COMPUTERRECHT 2017/153 (Apr. 2017), https://w 
ww.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Computerrecht_2017_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/6X5P-K3UR]. 
78. It could potentially be argued, although not explored at length in this article, that bundled 
privacy policies per se meet procedural unconscionability requirements due to their coercive status, 
should the terms themselves be excessively one-sided. The European Union has explicitly barred these 
types of notices precisely for this reason. 
79. See infra Part II.A and accompanying notes; Helen Nissenbaum, Respecting Context to 
Protect Privacy: Why Meaning Matters, SCI ENG. ETHICS (2015), DOI: 10.1007/s11948-015-9674-9 
[hereinafter Nissenbaum 1]. As the Obama Administration noted in 2012, “Respect for Context” means 
that organizations will collect data in a manner consistent with the context in which individuals provide 
such data. In practice, typical health care contexts likely provide ample contextual cues to determine 
whether data use or transfer is reasonable or not, especially when less straightforward uses require a 
specialized form and explicit consent. However, context also includes relationships between individual 
and the health data receiver. Id. This relationship creates either an express or inherent confidentiality 
expectation, which likely increases the degree of trust between the parties. When health data is used and 
shared within this context over time, trust usually accompanies the exchange. See, e.g., Neil Richards & 
Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 457 (2016) 
[hereinafter Richards & Hartzog] (describing fiduciary relationships as a foundational concept for trust 
by ‘reorient[ing] privacy and crystalliz[ing] the concept of trust in information relationships). 
80. Katherine Stewart, Transference as a Means of Building Trust in World Wide Web Sites, ICIS 
1999 PROCEEDINGS, PAPER 47, 460 (1999). Trust is transferred when one organization transfers, refers, 
or creates a relationship with the other. Therefore, products or services recommended (even when not 
insurance-eligible or HIPAA-regulated) by a physician likely will be perceived as higher trust products 
or services. Increasingly, physicians have recommended any number of commercial products or 












services individuals need, these individuals cannot afford not to trust them.81 
When health organizations provide services, there are not always 
alternatives to the type of care or technology an individual wishes to 
purchase. Contracts of adhesion, as a legal model, work somewhat 
effectively when many options exist, such as eight different coffee maker 
models, not when an individual needs an insulin pump.82  
2. Consent Myth 2: Consumers Would Read Privacy Policies If They 
Cared Enough (Structural Problem)83 
The connected consumer is bombarded with privacy policies so 
frequently today, a term has emerged for it: privacy policy fatigue. Several 
studies, from 2005 to today, illustrate that consumers often do not read 
privacy policies. In 2005, a few years after the Privacy Rule was 
implemented, 59% of patients recall receiving a privacy policy and 27% 
believed they had more rights than they did.84 In 2006, only 20% of people 
read privacy policies “most of the time.”85 Is it legally reasonable, then, to 
assume consent in these cases is legally binding? In 2014, a Pew Internet 
Study demonstrated that half of Americans could not explain the term 
“privacy policy.”86 
Fewer people read terms of use agreements fully, which often contain 
privacy language. According to one 2011 study, only 1% of consumers read 
the terms.87 Some studies have resulted in comical results. In one study, 
22,000 people agreed to clean toilets and other undesirable tasks for free 
Wi-Fi, with only 1 in 22,000 objecting to the terms of use.88 Jonathan Obar 
 
81. Id. 
82. This makes intuitive sense: if contracts of adhesion were deemed legal from an efficiency in 
economics perspective (i.e., it is too time-consuming to negotiate every consumer agreement, which 
reduces profits), likely it presumed that caveat emptor would guide these decisions, and that alternatives 
existed. In the healthcare space, especially healthcare technology, often alternatives do not exist. 
83. See Solove, supra note 9, at 1888. 
84. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE (US) COMMITTEE ON HEALTH RESEARCH AND THE PRIVACY OF 
HEALTH INFORMATION: THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE (2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK 
9579/ [https://perma.cc/BUA4-GAGU]. 
85. See Solove, supra note 9, at 1884 n.14 (quoting Helen Nissenbaum’s articulation of a 
TRUSTe & TNS study). 
86. See Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t Know What a Privacy Policy Is, PEW RES. 
CTR (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/12/04/half-of-americans-dont-know-wh 
at-aprivacy-policy-is/ [https://perma.cc/8KJ7-FB5R]. 
87. Solove, supra note 9, at 1884 n.15 (citing Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider’s discussion 
of a study in Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 647, 665–78 (2011)). 
88. Christopher Burgess, Wait, You Didn’t Want to Clean the Toilets? Should Have Read the 
Terms!, NAKED SECURITY (July 17, 2017), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2017/07/17/wait-you-didn 
t-want-to-clean-the-toilets-should-have-read-the-terms/ [https://perma.cc/KK36-ADUW]; Jonathan A. 
Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch [Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch], The Biggest Lie on the Internet: Ignoring the 
Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services, INFO COMM. & SOC’Y 1, 











and Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch tackled this issue, finding that 98% of individuals 
will miss these clauses.89 It is clear that consumers have been conditioned 
not to read things that look like legal documents, regardless of whether 
privacy language is included. There is a structural problem associated with 
policy fatigue: even “well-informed and rational” individuals cannot 
appropriately self-manage.90  
Consumers in many cases cannot afford to spend the time. One study 
approximated the time to read every privacy policy at seventy-six work days 
a year.91 Despite available time, cognitive limitations further restrict the 
degree individuals can take in all appropriate information across all privacy 
policies a consumer might encounter.92  
In these cases, although logic might tell us a consumer would allocate 
time to read these privacy policies due to the perceived inherent risk; 
instead, it is more likely that consumers would have a false sense of security 
and assume someone else will ensure these notices are “fair.” Individuals 
may even assume the presence of a notice at all means the organization has 
strong privacy practices, which may not be accurate. 
3. Consent Myth 3: Plain Language Makes Privacy Policies 
Understandable (Cognition Problem)93 
Although the plain language movement has improved the readability of 
privacy policy language,94 individuals still have a difficult time 
understanding what the language really means, to say nothing of vulnerable 
populations, differential reading levels, disabilities that make the traditional 
privacy policy less accessible to certain populations, and individuals where 
English is a Second Language (ESL).95 For example, if privacy policies are 
truncated and specific, often they leave out important details that make 
information “real” for the consumer; when privacy policies provide more 
 
16 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2018.1486870. Additionally, 93% of participants agreed 
to the Terms of Service, 97% of participants agreed to the privacy policy, and 74% of participants 
completely skipped the privacy policy via “quick join” click-wrap. 
89. Id. 
90. See Solove, supra note 9, at 1881. 
91. Alexis C. Madrigal, Reading the Privacy Policies You Encounter in a Year Would Take 76 
Work Days, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/re 
ading-the-privacy-policies-you-encounter-in-a-year-would-take-76-work-days/253851/ [https://perma. 
cc/93FW-EEPA]. 
92. M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1027, 1054 (2013), https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=ndl 
r. Information overload is a classic example of shared cognitive biases.  
93. See Solove, supra note 9, at 1883. 
94. Marie C. Pollio, The Inadequacy of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule: The Plain Language Notice of 
Privacy Practices and Patient Understanding, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 579, 601–04 (2004). 
95. Calo, supra note 92, at 1035 n.47 (quoting Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, 












detail, there is less time to read. The privacy community has responded to 
this challenge with an increased focus on layered privacy policies, where 
individuals can click on truncated areas of a primary notice to read more 
information about specific privacy practices.96  
Traditional health care benefits from the context provided in a doctor-
patient relationship. If a patient is concerned about information use, the 
individual can ask a question in the environment and likely has an 
opportunity to do so. When a patient checks into a clinic, the Notice of 
Privacy Practices is provided, and the patient has an opportunity to ask 
questions, should they so choose. Certainly, choice in traditional health care 
could improve, but the HIPAA model is better designed for a face-to-face 
interaction than for IoHT. For non-traditional health care, such as IoHT and 
health apps, individuals generally do not benefit from the built-in context or 
assistance a traditional health care environment might have. Rather, 
consumers are expected to derive any context from their interaction with a 
computer screen.  
Under some circumstances, when a patient is providing voluntary 
consent under HIPAA then later signing authorization forms, the patient 
may not clearly understand the difference. In these cases, the patient likely 
relies on the doctor as a fiduciary to explain this information fully. The 
patient also may not understand that HIPAA only covers certain entities and 
relationships and may feel a false sense of security for this reason, as well, 
a misplaced trust in the law for other health technologies, such as IoHT 
devices or other health applications. 
Consider individuals engaging in typical technology situations: an 
individual wants to use a health app recommended by a doctor, a connected 
insulin pump, a telehealth system, a connected scale, and a steps tracking 
device. Assuming each of these are reimbursable through insurance, each 
of these applications would require its own authorization form for the doctor 
to share medical information with these companies. Each time every 
company changes their data handling activities even in a limited way, such 
as engaging a new third-party technology supplier or the authorization term 
expires, these companies would likely need to execute another 
authorization. For those that are not reimbursable, they are not likely subject 
to HIPAA and fall to FTC broad oversight, with little to no specific 
requirements, except for the Fair Information Practices.97 In the past, an 
authorization was typically used for face-to-face activities; today, a paper 
 
96. Mehmet Munur, Sarah Branam & Matt Mrkobrad, Best Practices in Drafting Plain-
Language and Layered Privacy Policies, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROFS. (Sept. 13, 2002), https://iapp. 
org/news/a/2012-09-13-best-practicesin-drafting-plain-language-and-layered-privacy/ [https://perma.cc 
/2B9S-S6VV]. 
97. See supra Part I.B.5 and accompanying notes. 











model is being used for digital relationships, which have become more 
numerous in number, more attenuated in relationship, and more ubiquitous 
in our lives.98  
4. Consent Myth 4: Consumers Can Actively Represent Their Interests 
through Smart Reading of Privacy Policies and “Informed” 
Consent (Exogeneity Problem) 
Privacy advocates have focused on solving the first three consent 
problems by developing privacy policies that anticipate reading issues and 
more effectively manage time commitments. The FTC has advocated for 
“just-in-time” notice and consent.99 Although these developments have 
improved privacy policy contents and display, the model has not necessarily 
improved actual choice, for the reasons just described. Furthermore, some 
aspects of information handling simply cannot be communicated effectively 
to appropriately advise of downstream risks. 
Although information asymmetry plays a role in effective 
communication, in some cases the organization, which is providing 
computerized notice to which consumers consent on IoHT devices, does not 
clearly understand its own information handling practices. While it is 
possible to envisage improved disclosures, the issue with exogeneity is not 
necessarily one of communication; rather, it is an issue of organizational 
self-knowledge. Because organizations do not understand their own 
technology practices, organizations craft privacy notices with basic 
information, relying on the consumer to make an “informed choice” based 
on imperfect information, when most consumers are not privacy experts.100 
In many cases, even privacy experts cannot understand a privacy policy’s 
contents.101 Studies have shown that Americans may be willing to negotiate 
over personal information, but first, they want to understand how good the 
deal is and what risks they might face.102 If organizations can effectively 
communicate risks, individuals may be more likely to truly “choose” a path 
that not only advances individual autonomy but also satisfies commercial 
goals.103  
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Making choices about what data will be collected and how organizations 
might manage data downstream is probably the most challenging 
information for an individual to receive, understand, and accurately 
ascertain potential risk. Unlike other types of personal information, health 
data can contain directly sensitive information or proxies for sensitive 
information, and when data are exchanged, duplicated, or stored by a third 
party, these activities may increase the potential volume that could be 
misused or compromised.104 Furthermore, health data can easily be sold on 
the black market, netting $10–50 per record, especially insurance 
information often collected by CEs and shared with BAs for purposes of 
processing.105 Although other health organizations may not collect 
insurance information, health data collected can help to perpetuate fraud by 
providing information used to validate accounts or prove identity. For health 
data, advising of downstream risks becomes a more critical step. However, 
instead of focusing on advising the individual, in these cases, the law (where 
it applies) has directly regulated organizations. This degree of regulation 
has not effectively reduced privacy issues for health data. Data breaches, for 
example, continue to increase in frequency.106  
The use of third parties, especially for services, has simultaneously 
decreased cost while increasing exogeneity issues.107 Third party activities 
are generally secured via contract, whether formally under HIPAA as a BA, 
or other agreement, usually a Master Services Agreement. Third parties 
often use third parties, which in turn may use third parties, and so forth.108 
 
then to navigate a sea of privacy policies, followed by difficult to understand language and almost 
unforeseeable risks of which the individual is not advised. Finally, the individual has no private right of 
action under most models that regulate bad behavior. Under some state UDAP laws, an individual may 
have a right of action, or the attorney general may create a fund for aggrieved consumers. However, 
under the primary federal laws, HIPAA and the FTC Act, individuals do not have an individual right of 
action. Further, it is still extremely difficult to prove injury in tort or contract, for privacy or security 
issues, so the common law does not provide much of an alternative avenue. 
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cases, confidentiality obligations limit organizations sharing who their third parties are.  
108. A particularly curious situation is when a Third-Party A (TP-A) is in a relationship with the 
primary party (that provides service or product to a consumer), and TP-A uses a third party, TP-B, that 
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In “sub-privity,” none of these third parties likely has a direct relationship 
with the organization that provides service or contracts directly to the 
consumer.109 This means that the consumer, and sometimes the organization 
with which the consumer does business, does not have visibility to data 
location or handling procedures. Relationships subject to sub-privity likely 
suffer from greater exogeneity issues, which may also complicate recovery 
in breach of contract, as privacy or indemnification language may differ 
from contract to contract.110 When organizations may not be able to trace 
third-party data handling beyond the first or second third parties, it is 
unlikely that consumers will understand these intricacies or be able to 
reasonably enforce their own interests simply from reading a privacy 
notice.111  
5. Consent Myth 5: Current Models for Notice and Consent Are 
Applicable to New Technology (Temporal Problem) 
Technology has made the traditional consent model almost impossible 
to facilitate. Although specific health care activities enjoy some benefits of 
layered privacy protection under U.S. law, health technology of the future 
complicates both how organizations facilitate consent and the degree to 
which individuals benefit from fulfillment of existing requirements. 
Connected and distributed environments, designed to reduce costs and 
improve health outcomes, increase the frequency with which product and 
service uses can change, while simultaneously making it much more 
difficult to effectively inform consumers about privacy practices and 
potential risks.  
New technologies complicate traditional notice and consent models by 
frustrating the prior information aspect of “informed consent,” which 
incorporates a temporal requirement—for consent to be enforceable, notice 
of data collection and use practices must be communicated first.112 
Temporal limitations, or the requirement to notify and receive consent 
before data collection or use, may be impossible to facilitate with some 
 
including privacy provisions in the contract between TP-B and TP-A. See CHARLOTTE A. TSCHIDER, 
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technologies or tremendously impractical for other services. The frequency 
with which new notice and consent is required (i.e., upon material change) 
may further exacerbate structural and cognition problems, while 
simultaneously reducing organizational efficiencies.  
The IoHT has introduced wearables, implantable devices, affixed 
devices, and apps that connect to the Internet, promising reduced health care 
costs and consumer convenience.113 The backbone of IoHT includes big 
data, which often provides more effective services in IoHT from more 
substantial data collection.114 IoHT and other health applications, apps, and 
surgical equipment have begun to include AI capabilities.115  
Increasingly, health applications with AI apply machine learning utilities 
to facilitate self-learning models that reduce time and effort while increasing 
predictability and reliability. IoHT systems create and consume incredibly 
large data volumes.116 Machine learning utilities require big data for 
reliable, correct results; machine learning without big data produces 
predictably incorrect results.117 Unsupervised machine learning utilities 
often use data in unpredictable ways to create the algorithms on which the 
machine learning utility runs.118 Uniquely, these utilities create these 
algorithms from the data itself—by using computing power to find patterns 
amongst data, rather than superimposing a pattern on the data.119 The results 
could transform healthcare: with a big data backbone, AI could turn the 
world into a clinical trial, so long as AI can run on a big data database.120 
However, big data, and the technologies consuming its products, tend to run 
at cross-purposes with privacy from a collection perspective. AI, IoT, and 
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big data seek to maximize collection, rather than minimize it, to the benefit 
of the patient and the organization.121 
The Consent Myth consists of five major problems that, considered 
holistically, render consent a choice that does not protect individual 
autonomy. These problems illustrate that the predominant privacy model 
cannot, in its current conception, effectively advance privacy interests, 
especially in the health sector.  
IV. PRINCIPLES OF A “CHOICE-FIRST” PRIVACY MODEL 
So how might organizations solve these complex problems? A “Choice-
First” Model considers the bargaining position of the consumer in relation 
to an organization, a model based on the expectations of an ongoing 
relationship rather than a one-time, transactional relationship. The Choice-
First Model places the consumer, an individual, as the central focus. With 
recognition of an ongoing relationship oriented within an ever-evolving and 
changing contextual environment, orienting a model towards an ongoing 
relationship both reinforces multiple opportunities to gather more 
information, make choices, and build trust. 
A Choice-First Model may be implemented differently depending on the 
circumstances. However, certain principles, designed to combat existing 
problems, should both advance individual interests and account for some 
degree of organizational flexibility. Due to substantial existing privacy 
problems that erode autonomy, at least initially a Choice-First Model may 
appear restrictive for less-regulated organizations, such as those only under 
the FTC’s purview, but may better fit new technology models than existing 
HIPAA regulation.122  
A. Principle 1: Initiating Service Should Be Non-Coercive 
Within the health care sector and other sectors, consumers who initially 
form a relationship with an organization have a specific purpose for that 
relationship: they want a product or service. Although this moment may 
provide an opportunity for organizations to capitalize on consumer interest 
by gathering permission for additional uses, bundling secondary uses with 
primary uses creates a high likelihood for coercion. Non-HIPAA-regulated 
organizations often bundle consent to use data required for a service or 
product to function with other desirable or lucrative data not required for 
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the service.123 Although substantively these secondary uses may not be 
considered substantively coercive, the act of bundling itself could be 
considered a more coercive practice.  
When an organization only bargains for data central to the service or 
product’s purpose, primary use, a consumer benefits from the immediate 
context of the information provided: data collected will be foreseeable and 
generally reasonable, because data are necessary for the service or product 
to function properly. For example, if a consumer signs up for a health tracker 
that monitors diet, steps per day, weight, and blood sugar values; it will 
likely be foreseeable that the organization will need access to health 
information and activity levels for purposes of storing the data or offering 
online coaching and reminders. If the steps-per-day feature includes a map 
that records steps on a geographic map, it is reasonably foreseeable that the 
organization captures geolocation data. 
Other benefits to this type of model include length and audience 
appropriateness: it is far easier to write privacy policies that account for 
fewer uses and adapt this communication for the audience. Initial notice 
could be improved, for example by including more active, emotionally rich 
language, “visceral language,” which more persuasively advise risks.124 
Organizations could also tailor notices to specific user groups to make them 
more understandable and engaging or provide different models for 
sophisticated parties.125 
The marketplace will also benefit by reducing administrative tasks 
associated with commencing service. Instead of an organization being 
responsible for gathering consent and managing associated workflows and 
records, consent may not be necessary. When data sharing is based on the 
acquisition of a product and data shared is reasonably foreseeable to the 
consumer, the notice functions as a reminder, rather than the primary 
communication vehicle. Instead, the context of the initial transaction itself 
and the nature of the product or service provides the framework for 
understanding what data will be collected and under what circumstances.126 
Organizations can amplify understanding by clearly describing data 
collection as part of marketing materials related to features or functions. 
 
123. Bundled consent leads to reduced understanding of data handling practices, extends the 
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due to the adhesive nature of the agreement. 
124. See Calo, supra note 92, at 1035, 1045. 
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This model is consistent with HIPAA requirements and works as 
intended: most individuals in a medical office, for example, likely do not 
need to read the Notice of Privacy Practices, although they have an 
opportunity to do so. Primary use would involve providing a privacy notice 
but limiting its contents to only uses that a reasonable person would expect, 
such as data collection central to a system’s functionality. For example, a 
FitBit-like device that monitors healthy behaviors would likely gather 
information about steps, dietary information, and geolocation data for 
purposes of providing the FitBit service and fulfilling marketing 
commitments. However, an individual’s mobile device contacts list might 
be outside what an individual would expect. Because primary use is 
reasonably expected, consent need not be required: simply using the device 
demonstrates implicit consent. Although the Fair Information Practices 
might recommend employing consent, a model for primary uses without 
consent would create greater consistency for both HIPAA-regulated and 
non-HIPAA-regulated organizations. 
B. Principle 2: Additional Uses Must Be Informatively Communicated and 
Require Explicit Consent 
Secondary uses of personal information or additional data collection 
have a higher potential for abuse. Further, consumers may be less likely to 
understand the ramifications of uses that extend beyond an immediate 
product or service. For this reason, secondary uses should require 
sufficiently educational communications that enable a consumer to better 
understand risks to her prior to consenting.127 One way to contextualize 
these exchanges is to call them a “proposal,” or other language that signals 
an invitation to bargain rather than an obligation to disclose.  
Specific proposals should be highly specific, not misleading, and should 
contain: 1) the specific use or category of uses proposed (e.g., marketing 
materials sent to your email address), 2) the data targeted and why the 
organization wants these data elements (their value), and 3) detailed risks 
associated with sharing these data. Each proposal should be displayed one 
at a time to focus attention. After a consumer makes a decision, the system 
should not display the exact same proposal to solicit consent again in a 
manner to irritate or attempt to coerce the individual to change her mind. 
These proposals should be displayed after the individual has already 
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initiated the service, and not as part of the service initiation workflow or 
bundled with the primary use notice.  
In this model, the individual has already received the service and 
therefore is under no actual or perceived requirement to agree to share more 
information than she is comfortable. Further, proposals regarding the data’s 
business value juxtaposes data wanted (secondary use data) with data 
needed (primary use data), which reduces power imbalances between the 
consumer and the organization. This model reinforces the exchange of 
promises and consideration.128  
Finally, organizations should communicate a risk advisory and use real 
examples that help an individual contextualize a potential downstream risk. 
See an example proposal below: 
The HeartMonitor Lite measures your heart rate through vibrations. 
We would like to share your heart rate data and other data collected 
through your passive use of this device (including GPS data) with our 
partners, who develop pharmaceuticals. We will receive a financial 
benefit for these data. Although we contractually bind our partners to 
a contract with us, we cannot guarantee the same privacy or security 
protections you receive from us. Do you consent to share these data 
with our partners? (Yes/No/More Information) 
This example is written with the intention of giving an individual 
appropriate information pertinent to her decision, such as the organization’s 
financial interest in the data and potential risks to the individual. A proposal 
could be coupled with a financial or other incentive for providing this 
information, such as access to other functionality or direct payment, 
although for more sensitive data use, financial compensation could be 
prohibited.129 Although this does create a market for information to some 
extent, the individual can make a choice, rather than being duped into 
sharing data that nevertheless benefit the organization. Furthermore, other 
 
128. It should be noted that of course, a bargain and exchange model does potentially have a 
higher impact on individuals at a lower income level, as they may not be able to afford privacy. However, 
in this model, rather than “buying back” privacy, the individual can choose whether their information is 
worth the additional service or financial benefit and opt-into these practices.  
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social benefits could also result, including better or more effective 
technologies that can improve human health.  
HIPAA authorization, to some degree, uses specific communication 
about data type and associated uses, although information about financial 
interests and risks are not usually disclosed. Further, HIPAA authorizations 
require a level of specificity that would not likely be compatible with less 
defined purposes, such as data collection for AI use. See an example 
proposal below: 
Your Daily Health Service uses lifestyle information entered by you 
and gathered through wearing the Daily Health bracelet to predict a 
personalized plan for improving your health. We would like to use 
your lifestyle information to improve the service for all users by 
combining your data with the data of other users. This prediction 
model uses artificial intelligence and we cannot always predict how 
or for what purposes your data might be used. We remove some 
identifying data, but the data remaining could be enough data to 
identify you. Do you consent to share these data for use in our AI 
system? (Yes/No/More Information) 
This example might not be able to qualify for a legal authorization under 
HIPAA, as the data uses and details are not highly specific. If HHS wants 
to support new technologies like AI, it might consider permitting broader, 
less-specific use disclosures for organizations creating AI utilities.130 HHS 
could use a similar model to its analysis of data for future research data uses 
as a starting point.131 Organizations involved in AI activities could secure 
authorization so long as they have an internal Institutional Review Board 
(IRB), or an advisory board tasked with evaluating clinical study ethics and 
human subject safety, specifically defined for AI activities to anticipate 
potential ethical or safety issues and undergo regular Privacy Impact 
Assessments (PIAs) or audits. For example, the IRB could engage an expert 
outside firm to examine testing, machine learning training approaches, or 
question the utility of collected data for ongoing AI uses. 
Of course, organizations may desire to incentivize consumers to share 
additional data for other purposes.132 In other cases, secondary uses may be 
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132. When organizations desire to collect additional data, they may engage in some contracting 
process. See generally Jake Linford, Unilateral Reordering in the Reel World, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1395 
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intrinsically reasonable, such as health data for research purposes.133 
However, organizations will likely want to use previously collected 
personal data for other (often commercial) purposes. However, instead of 
gathering such data through techniques that hide the true motivation for data 
collection and leave consumers without the full picture, organizations can 
use these models to transparently propose new bargains to consumers. More 
frequently, organizations have begun to incentivize data sharing with 
coupons or additional services. When consumers have accurate, pertinent 
information, they are comparatively better positioned to advocate for their 
respective interests. Unlike a contract of adhesion, discrete bargaining of 
this kind reduces information asymmetries.  
Organizations should require explicit consent when agreeing to 
proposals that involve the collection or use of personal information.134 
Because secondary uses are not reasonably foreseeable and potentially 
could introduce greater risk to the individual due to their exogeneity, 
explicit consent when combined with appropriate information would dually 
ensure an individual intends to share data in this way and protect 
organizations using these data. 
C. Principle 3: Address User-Centric Needs with UI-Based Controls and 
User Preferences 
A Choice-First Model should not only involve discrete exchanges at the 
beginning of a relationship: individuals should be able to make decisions 
throughout an ongoing relationship with an organization. Privacy should be 
part of most interactions and workflow within a User Interface (UI). User 
Experience (UX) engineers, used for a variety of purposes in industry, have 
analyzed the mental models individuals bring to business processes, 
products, and digital interfaces.135 Integrating choices into each workflow 
not only illustrates a commitment to strong design, it also reflects an 
 
133. See generally, W. Nicholson Price II, Drug Approval in a Learning Health System, 102 
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This could be specified within the Proposal or established by administrative interpretation, such as a cap 
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form. 
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understanding that individuals benefit from context for making decisions 
about their privacy. If choice is a central requirement for human autonomy, 
choice should be built into a system, intrinsic to UI functionality, with 
appropriate information available at precise moments.  
Workflow-based privacy controls put the power of choosing which 
information to share and under what circumstances into the hands of an 
individual. Work-flow based privacy controls usually involve 1) integrated, 
use-case controls and 2) settings-based preference management.136 Settings-
based preference management allow for an individual to make “just in time” 
choices about previous decisions, such as whether to share photos with an 
organization, whether a profile is public or private, or when an individual 
shares information with a health care provider. Consider the following 
scenario: 
Serge has an online account that tracks his seizure frequency from an 
implantable brain stimulator that is equipped with wireless 
connectivity. The data passes to a backend system where it is 
aggregated, analyzed, and displayed on a mobile app. When looking 
at the results, Serge notices a higher frequency this month than he has 
in months past. In the interface, there is a Send to Dr. button with a 
Mail icon. When he clicks Send, it opens an email record, appends 
the data report, displays the last neurologist’s e-mail address, and 
sends to Serge’s neurologist. Serge has an opportunity to look at the 
button and change his mind or otherwise change his neurologist. 
While use-case controls tie to specific actual tasks within a site, settings 
group preferences together for easy access and change. Preferences may 
include detailed options but benefit from top-level simplicity. Preferences 
most clearly tie to broad decisions rather than highly contextual ones (e.g., 
an individual wanting to view previously collected personal information for 
purposes of determining that such information is accurate). Under HIPAA, 
applicable entities must provide access to data and facilitate portability 
requests. Other requests that merit consideration include risk-minimizing 
requests, such as consent revocation with blocking or compulsory de-
identification.137 
 
136. The term “control” used here is meant to denote specific settings or interactive features which 
enable an individual to make decisions about what data are shared and with whom.  
137. Consent revocation with blocking simply stops automated systems from continuing to 
proliferate personal information through recurring processes. Compulsory de-identification has not been 
discussed much to-date, but it could provide an alternative option to data erasure, which may reduce 
data volume for technologies dependent upon those data. Compulsory de-identification could be initiated 
by the individual. If the United States decided this could be an option for better overall individual choice, 
organizations should have a clear view of appropriate standards for de-identification, other than the 












D. Principle 4: The Better-Positioned Party Should Manage Exogenous 
Privacy Risks 
Exogenous privacy risks generally result from either lack of effective 
information and practices required for a consumer to make an autonomous 
choice or information about business practices that are unavailable to an 
individual. Organizations can address the first circumstance by focusing on 
Principles 1–3. However, the second requires special consideration. These 
business practices usually are confidential and not immediately apparent 
from the perspective of the individual. For example, a consumer may not 
know that a Website is displayed from a cloud provider in Indonesia or that 
a contract group handles health care insurance claims.  
Although Principles 1–3 position the individual in the center of the 
Choice-First Model, for exogenous data such as technology infrastructure 
types or third parties engaged, the model must rely on organizations making 
these choices for three reasons: 1) Organizations routinely make technology 
and third-party choices in the normal course of business, are reasonably 
sophisticated with respect to third-party contracting, and should be 
responsible for corresponding risks as a party to the contract; 2) 
Organizations are comparatively better positioned to manage exogenous 
risks on behalf of users due to both their contract status and their operational 
and legal proximity to third parties; and 3) Technology and service choices 
usually apply to all individuals as a group (not specific individuals), rending 
third-party management a collective endeavor.  
From a risk management perspective, organizations should manage 
third-party risk by conducting regular assessments and drafting and 
enforcing contractual commitments. However, at least some transparency 
could enable effective privacy self-management for engaged individuals. A 
relatively simple way to support self-management is to permit requests for 
information. For example, organizations should be required to retain a 
named list of third parties pertinent to the information collected, used, 
transferred, or stored. Links should be provided to these third parties’ 
privacy policies, if not consistent with the primary organization. 
Organizations could provide additional context, such as the rationale behind 
using these third parties or what they do on behalf of the organization.  
CONCLUSION 
A choice-first privacy model enables an individual to make 
discretionary, contextual decisions about their personal information in a 
prior and continuous model. Within this model, an individual will be less 
burdened by reasonably predictable data uses while dynamically engaged in 











bargaining over less predictable data uses. Because primary and secondary 
data uses are not bundled under one privacy notice, individuals can choose 
to forego additional data collection and use, if desired. Further, when 
individuals can self-manage in a context-specific manner, they are better 
able to make discrete decisions about their data at a point in time, enabling 
decision-making that is likely clearer to the individual. Finally, when 
organizations are directly responsible for risk factors exogenous to the 
individual, organizations cannot pass on the responsibility to individuals 
who are not able to fully ascertain such risk.  
The increasingly pervasive interaction between private and public 
spheres continues to complicate individuals’ privacy interests, especially for 
connected health technologies like the IoHT. Although perfect choice might 
be illusory or at least aspirational, the potential for less abusive practices 
and enhanced choice in human-computer contexts might be possible. By 
confronting our misconceptions about consent, the United States will be 
better able to consider more effective models for individual choice that 
enhance, rather than hinder, individual autonomy. 
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